In the face of the stock market crash generated by the Covid-19 pandemic – and in particular, during the first stage of this crisis –, a large number of U.S. public companies deployed shareholder rights plans – a takeover defense mechanism commonly known as poison pill. As is well known, the poison pills were devised and grew popular in the wake of the 80s takeover wave. Later, they were gradually abandoned, mainly due to (1) the adoption of a strict standard of judicial review by Delaware courts and (2) proxy advisors’ aver-sion to this defense strategy. In 2020, the collapse of share price caused by the pandemic exposed cor-porations to undesirable takeovers and shareholders to exploitative raiders. As a matter of fact, the crisis was extraordinary, in the sense that it was sud-den, caused by external factors, and unrelated to the business fundamentals of corporations. Additionally, the unexpected lack of liquidity experienced by shareholders might have induced them to accept low offers. The poison pills seemed to be the most immediate strategy to mitigate such adverse effects of the crisis: from January 2020 to May 2020 approxi-mately 46 companies announced the adoption of a poison pill, whereas by the end of 2019 only 25 companies of the S&P 500 index had active poison pills. For a moment, the return of poison pills recalled the popularity of the 80s and revitalized the debate on the review standard – in particular, be-cause these defenses were used as crisis pills: i.e. an extraordinary response to an unprecedented situation. The prospect of a doctrinal shift of courts regarding these defenses was al-so supported by a more permissive approach by proxy advisors. Nevertheless, the market reacted to the crisis unexpectedly soon, the panic faded away, and the share prices returned to the pre-pandemic level. As a re-sult, from May 2020 to June 2021, only 56 U.S. corporations implemented shareholder rights plans. Therefore, when the Delaware Chancery Court had the opportunity to rule on a pandemic-related poison pill, it unsurprisingly struck that down. In the Williams case, both the Delaware Chancery Court (in February 2021) and the Delaware Supreme Court (in November 2021) clarified that, regardless the crisis effects which they are intended to curb, poison pills always must meet the Unocal-Unitrin standard. The Williams decision is likely to discourage corporations from adopting these defenses. It is also likely to end the return of this tactic. Yet, we contend that this case left the door ajar for crisis pills – at least in principle. In Williams, the relevant pill was quite aggressive, and Delaware courts hold that the plan failed to meet the «proportionality» prong of the standard, ra-ther than the «reasonableness» one. Consequently, it cannot be excluded that an extraordinary crisis, such as the one caused by the pandemic, consti-tutes the «reasonable threat» required by the first prong of the Unocal standard; and a pill based only on such a peculiar situation is considered «reasonable» for the purpose.
Nel corso della prima fase della crisi pandemica, a fronte del crollo del prezzo delle azioni delle più grandi società quotate, numerose public com-pany americane hanno adottato shareholder rights plan qualificabili come poison pill. Il numero è stato così rilevante da richiamare alla memoria il de-cennio della takover wave e gli iniziali fasti di questa controversa defensive tactic. Dal gennaio 2020 al maggio dello stesso anno, circa 46 società hanno annunciato l’adozione di un plan di questo tipo, laddove alla fine del 2019 solo 25 tra le S&P 500 presentavano poison pill attive. Significativo è risulta-to anche l’atteggiamento dei più grandi proxy advisor i quali, solitamente as-sai contrari all’adozione di queste tattiche, hanno in questo caso seguito un approccio più permissivo o comunque non ostile. Vero è anche che questo trend all’incremento nell’impiego dello stru-mento si è rapidamente invertito: tra maggio 2020 e giugno 2021 – in un ar-co temporale triplo rispetto al primo considerato – «soltanto» altre 56 so-cietà statunitensi si sono dotate di poison pill. Il che probabilmente segnala la fine dell’emergenza per i mercati finanziari – o della percezione della stes-sa. È possibile, però, che un contributo a rafforzare questa inversione e a fre-nare la nuova primavera delle tattiche in questione sia pervenuto da una re-cente decisione delle corti del Delaware. L’idea, infatti, che il contesto emergenziale ne consentisse l’adozione anche al di fuori del tradizionale pe-rimetro di legittimità consolidato dalla giurisprudenza del Delaware ha trova-to una battuta d’arresto nelle recentissime pronunce della Chancery Court (a febbraio 2021) e della Supreme Court (a novembre 2021) sul caso Williams. Può ipotizzarsi che tali decisioni abbiano sconsigliato l’adozione di ulteriori pillole nonché il rinnovo di quelle introdotte all’inizio della pandemia. Tut-tavia, le pronunce Williams si sono appuntate sulla verifica della proporzio-nalità della poison pill in questione piuttosto che sulla esclusione di altro elemento forse più interessante in termini di judicial review standard e di adattamento dello stesso alle crisi: i giudici non hanno del tutto escluso che la peculiare concorrenza di circostanze determinata da una situazione emer-genziale quale quella pandemica possa costituire di per sé quella threat ri-chiesta per la legittima attivazione di una difesa. La strada per la creazione di crisis pill, in altri termini, si è per certo ristretta ma non può considerarsi del tutto sbarrata.
Le Poison Pill dopo Williams
MATERA P;SBARBARO F M
2022-01-01
Abstract
In the face of the stock market crash generated by the Covid-19 pandemic – and in particular, during the first stage of this crisis –, a large number of U.S. public companies deployed shareholder rights plans – a takeover defense mechanism commonly known as poison pill. As is well known, the poison pills were devised and grew popular in the wake of the 80s takeover wave. Later, they were gradually abandoned, mainly due to (1) the adoption of a strict standard of judicial review by Delaware courts and (2) proxy advisors’ aver-sion to this defense strategy. In 2020, the collapse of share price caused by the pandemic exposed cor-porations to undesirable takeovers and shareholders to exploitative raiders. As a matter of fact, the crisis was extraordinary, in the sense that it was sud-den, caused by external factors, and unrelated to the business fundamentals of corporations. Additionally, the unexpected lack of liquidity experienced by shareholders might have induced them to accept low offers. The poison pills seemed to be the most immediate strategy to mitigate such adverse effects of the crisis: from January 2020 to May 2020 approxi-mately 46 companies announced the adoption of a poison pill, whereas by the end of 2019 only 25 companies of the S&P 500 index had active poison pills. For a moment, the return of poison pills recalled the popularity of the 80s and revitalized the debate on the review standard – in particular, be-cause these defenses were used as crisis pills: i.e. an extraordinary response to an unprecedented situation. The prospect of a doctrinal shift of courts regarding these defenses was al-so supported by a more permissive approach by proxy advisors. Nevertheless, the market reacted to the crisis unexpectedly soon, the panic faded away, and the share prices returned to the pre-pandemic level. As a re-sult, from May 2020 to June 2021, only 56 U.S. corporations implemented shareholder rights plans. Therefore, when the Delaware Chancery Court had the opportunity to rule on a pandemic-related poison pill, it unsurprisingly struck that down. In the Williams case, both the Delaware Chancery Court (in February 2021) and the Delaware Supreme Court (in November 2021) clarified that, regardless the crisis effects which they are intended to curb, poison pills always must meet the Unocal-Unitrin standard. The Williams decision is likely to discourage corporations from adopting these defenses. It is also likely to end the return of this tactic. Yet, we contend that this case left the door ajar for crisis pills – at least in principle. In Williams, the relevant pill was quite aggressive, and Delaware courts hold that the plan failed to meet the «proportionality» prong of the standard, ra-ther than the «reasonableness» one. Consequently, it cannot be excluded that an extraordinary crisis, such as the one caused by the pandemic, consti-tutes the «reasonable threat» required by the first prong of the Unocal standard; and a pill based only on such a peculiar situation is considered «reasonable» for the purpose.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.