La maggiore assertività della politica estera russa: la “rivoluzione passiva” e il caso della Georgia

After the end of the Cold war, the Russian Federation had to recast its international identity and reshape its foreign policy goals. Extant research has frequently focused on foreign policy change and on variations between the presidencies of Eltsin and Putin. In this paper we first trace the evolution of Russia’s international posture after the collapse of Soviet Union and analyze its relations with Georgia, emphasizing that Russian foreign policy in its near abroad has been characterized by both continuity and change. In addition, discontinuities do not concern Russia’s understanding of its hegemonic role in the post-soviet region, but are more related with the means and the assertiveness the country has pursued its foreign policy goals. As a matter of fact, even though alternative geopolitical paradigms (Atlanticism vs. Eurasianism) have emerged and to a certain extent coexisted during the last decades, Russian Federation has constantly attempted at keeping Georgia within its sphere of influence. Main changes – as mentioned above – concern the foreign policy tools the country has resorted to: whereas during the 1990s Russia has frequently used its diplomatic and economic leverage, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin the military tool was used as well. Indeed, the 2008 Georgian War was Russia’s first successful military action outside of its borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union and anticipated subsequent military actions against Ukraine and Syria. In the second part of the paper we propose an interpretation of the Russia’s enhanced assertiveness grounded on domestic factors. More specifically, we consider the break of ‘siloviki’ into the upper echelon of power and the subsequent re-centralization of power in the country as the main determinants of changes in Russia’s relations with its near abroad. Our argument is that the replacement of fragmented and powerful interest groups with ‘siloviki’, namely members of security services who gained prominence in the ministries of internal affairs and defence, allowed Putin on one side to consolidate his own power enforcing a ‘power vertical’ and curtailing the autonomy of other political institutions, and, on the other side, to centralize the process of foreign-policy making and to prompt a more assertive foreign policy. We understand these changes as instances of a ‘passive revolution’, to wit the process of transformation of Russia’s nomenklatura that has unfolded during the neoliberal era. That being said, we also emphasize the role played by the international factors, especially NATO eastern enlargement, which frustrated Russian expectations to cooperate on an equal footing with western powers. In other words, in Russia’s view, the country’s efforts to build a closer and friendlier relation with former adversaries were not reciprocated. From this perspective, it appears quite evident that – once Russia’s capabilities have increased thanks to domestic changes – its reactions to the western interferences in the country’s near abroad have become more confrontational.