During last decades non-democratic regimes have received increased attention. The new wave of studies on authoritarianism has been dominated by the neo-institutionalist approach, which has focused on the impact of pseudo-democratic institutions on authoritarian resilience. According to most studies, dictators adopt formal political institutions because they perform specific functions that favor autocratic survival. Yet, pseudo-democratic institutions presents several risks for dictators’ survival and, aware of the threats that may stem from their adoption, autocratic leaders tend to introduce them only when they face domestic or international pressures and when other survival strategies are exhausted or unavailable. Against this background, I suggests that researchers should be wary of considering the introduction of legislatures, parties and elections as a signal of authoritarian upgrading and treat them as mere survival strategies, whose adoption entails not only opportunities but also relevant dangers for the incumbents. Moreover, I suggest to focus also on other factors, especially on economic resources and international sponsors, that could influence authoritarian stability. Actually, empirical evidence shows that changes in the authoritarian pact due to negative economic performance are associated with higher risks of regime breakdown. Also external sponsors may enhance, through their support, the capacity of autocracies to face domestic threats. On the contrary, democratic powers are believed to decrease the degree of freedom of their illiberal allies and induce them to adopt decisions that may reduce their chances of survival.
I regimi autoritari contemporanei tra aggiornamento, sopravvivenza e crisi
Loretta Dell'Aguzzo
2022-01-01
Abstract
During last decades non-democratic regimes have received increased attention. The new wave of studies on authoritarianism has been dominated by the neo-institutionalist approach, which has focused on the impact of pseudo-democratic institutions on authoritarian resilience. According to most studies, dictators adopt formal political institutions because they perform specific functions that favor autocratic survival. Yet, pseudo-democratic institutions presents several risks for dictators’ survival and, aware of the threats that may stem from their adoption, autocratic leaders tend to introduce them only when they face domestic or international pressures and when other survival strategies are exhausted or unavailable. Against this background, I suggests that researchers should be wary of considering the introduction of legislatures, parties and elections as a signal of authoritarian upgrading and treat them as mere survival strategies, whose adoption entails not only opportunities but also relevant dangers for the incumbents. Moreover, I suggest to focus also on other factors, especially on economic resources and international sponsors, that could influence authoritarian stability. Actually, empirical evidence shows that changes in the authoritarian pact due to negative economic performance are associated with higher risks of regime breakdown. Also external sponsors may enhance, through their support, the capacity of autocracies to face domestic threats. On the contrary, democratic powers are believed to decrease the degree of freedom of their illiberal allies and induce them to adopt decisions that may reduce their chances of survival.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.