Patron-client state relations and the geopolitics of authoritarian survival and breakdown: evidence from the MENA countries

In this paper, we explain how the international relations of authoritarian regimes shape their reaction to nonviolent popular mobilisation. We identify four main strategies of authoritarian survival and argue that – from the incumbents’ perspective – repression and democratic opening are riskier than informal and formal co-optation. Thus, we ask why some nondemocratic rulers select riskier rather than safer strategies. Although recent studies have devoted much attention to the relevance of international factors in shaping domestic politics, this proposition has not been thoroughly theorised nor scrutinised empirically. We focus on authoritarian regimes that have established patron–client relations with foreign powers and argue that patrons’ regimes influence the selection of specific survival strategies by threatened clients. We hypothesise that dictators with democratic patrons are induced to adopt riskier strategies of survival, whereas clients of autocracies are more likely to select safer strategies. We test our hypothesis on MENA countries.