In recent decades, scholars have devoted much attention to the importance of ‘black knights’ – that is, non-democracies that seek to weaken the liberal performance of another country or bolster the power of fellow autocrats through various means – in promoting authoritarian survival, overlooking instead how specific characteristics of the recipients of international support influence the foreign policy of authoritarian sponsors. An analysis of relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Yemen since 1970 highlights that target states’ capacity is crucial to understanding the strategies adopted by authoritarian sponsors. In their relations with vulnerable states, these countries appear more likely to use aid conditionality and to extend their patronage network beyond the incumbents’ inner circle, acquiring multiple non-state clients with the goal of pressuring target governments from within. Moreover, the permissive domestic opportunity structures of weak states make authoritarian powers more inclined to attempt to spread their regime ideology abroad.
Authoritarian Sponsorship of Weak States: Saudi Arabia’s Extended Patronage Network in Yemen
Loretta Dell'Aguzzo
2025-01-01
Abstract
In recent decades, scholars have devoted much attention to the importance of ‘black knights’ – that is, non-democracies that seek to weaken the liberal performance of another country or bolster the power of fellow autocrats through various means – in promoting authoritarian survival, overlooking instead how specific characteristics of the recipients of international support influence the foreign policy of authoritarian sponsors. An analysis of relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Yemen since 1970 highlights that target states’ capacity is crucial to understanding the strategies adopted by authoritarian sponsors. In their relations with vulnerable states, these countries appear more likely to use aid conditionality and to extend their patronage network beyond the incumbents’ inner circle, acquiring multiple non-state clients with the goal of pressuring target governments from within. Moreover, the permissive domestic opportunity structures of weak states make authoritarian powers more inclined to attempt to spread their regime ideology abroad.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.